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Certainly the words “statistical evidence,” or perhaps just “evidence,” are much used in statistical contexts. It is
fair to say, however, that the precise characterization of this concept is somewhat elusive. Our goal here is to pro-
vide a deﬁnition of how to measure statistical evidence for any particular statistical problem. Since evidence is
what causes beliefs to change, it is proposed to measure evidence by the amount beliefs change from a priori
to a posteriori. As such, our deﬁnition involves prior beliefs and this raises issues of subjectivity versus objectivity
in statistical analyses. This is dealt with through a principle requiring the falsiﬁability of any ingredients to
a statistical analysis. These concerns lead to checking for prior-data conﬂict and measuring the a priori bias in
a prior.
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There is considerable controversy about what is a suitable theory of
statistical inference. Given that statistical reasoning is used throughout
science, it is important that such a theory be sound, in the sense that it
is free from illogicalities and counterexamples, and be complete, in the
sense that it produces unambiguous answers to all properly expressed
statistical problems.
It is our contention that any such theory must deal explicitly with
the concept of statistical evidence. Statistical evidence is much referred
to in the literature, but most theories fail to address the topic by pre-
scribing how it should be measured and how inferences should be
based on this. The purpose of this paper is to provide an outline of a the-
ory based on an explicit measure of statistical evidence.
Before describing this, there are several preliminary issues that need
to be discussed. To start, we are explicit about what could be seen as the
most basic problem in statistics and to which all others are related.
Example 1. The Archetypal Statistical Problem.
Suppose there is a populationΩwith#(Ω)b∞. SoΩ is just a ﬁnite set
of objects. Furthermore, suppose that there is a measurement X:Ω→χ.
As such X(ω)∈χ is the measurement of object ω∈Ω.
This leads to the fundamental object of interest in a statistical prob-
lem, namely, the relative frequency distribution of X over Ω or, equiva-
lently, the relative frequency function fX(x)= #({ω :X(ω)=x})/#(Ω)
for x∈X . Notice that the frequency distribution is deﬁned no matter
what the set χ is. Typically, only a subset {ω1,… ,ωn}⊂Ω can be ob-
served giving the data xi=X(ωi) for i=1,… ,n where n≪ #(Ω), so
there is uncertainty about fX.on behalf of the Research Network ofThe standard approach to dealingwith the uncertainty concerning fX
is to propose that fX∈{fθ:θ∈Θ}, a collection of possible distributions, and
referred to as the statistical model. Due to the ﬁniteness of Ω, and the
speciﬁc accuracy with which X(ω) is measured, the parameter space Θ
is also ﬁnite.
Note that in Example 1 there are no inﬁnities and everything is de-
ﬁned simply in terms of counting.
So the position taken here is that in statistical problems there are es-
sentially no inﬁnities and there are no continuous distributions. Inﬁnity
and continuity are employed as simplifying approximations to a ﬁnite
reality. This has a number of consequences, for example, any counterex-
ample or paradox that depends intrinsically on inﬁnity is not valid. Also,
densities must be deﬁned as limits as in fθ(x)=limϵ→0Pθ(Nϵ(x))/
Vol(Nϵ(x)) where Nϵ(x) is a set that shrinks nicely to x, as described in
Rudin [27], so Pθ(Nϵ(x))≈ fθ(x)Vol(Nϵ(x)) for small ϵ.
To deﬁne a measure of evidence we need to add one more ingredi-
ent, namely, a prior probability distribution as represented by density
π onΘ. For some, the addition of the priorwill seem immediately objec-
tionable as it is supposed to reﬂect beliefs about the true value of θ∈Θ
and as such is subjective and so unscientiﬁc. Our answer to this is that
all the ingredients to a statistical analysis are subjective with the excep-
tion, at least when it is collected correctly through random sampling, of
the observed data. For example, amodel {fθ:θ∈Θ} is chosen and there is
typically no greater foundation for this than it is believed to be reason-
able, for example, this could be a set of normal distributions with un-
known mean and variance.
The subjective nature of any statistical analysis is naturally of con-
cern in scientiﬁc contexts as it is reasonable toworry about the possibil-
ity of these choices distorting what the data is saying through theComputational and Structural Biotechnology. This is an open access article under the CC BY
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principle.
Principle of empirical criticism: Every ingredient chosen by a statis-
tician as part of a statistical analysis must be checked against the ob-
served data to determine whether or not it makes sense.
This supposes that the data, which hereafter is denoted by x, has
been collected appropriately and so can be considered as being
objective.
Model checking, where it is asked if the observed data is surprising
for each fθ in the model, is a familiar process and so the model satisﬁes
this principle. It is less well-known that it is possible to provide a consis-
tent check on the prior by assessingwhether or not the true value of θ is
a surprising value for π. Such a check is carried out by computing a tail
probability based on the prior predictive distribution of a minimal sufﬁ-
cient statistic (see Evans andMoshonov [20,21]). In Evans and Jang [16]
it is proved that this tail probability is consistent in the sense that, as the
amount of data grows, it converges to a probability that measures how
far into the tails of the prior the true value of θ lies. Here “lying in the
tails” is interpreted as indicating that a prior-data conﬂict exists since
the data is not coming from a distribution where the prior assigns
most of the belief. In Evans and Jang [17] it is shown how this approach
to assessing prior-data conﬂict can be used to characterizeweakly infor-
mative priors and also how tomodify a prior, when such a conﬂict is ob-
tained, in a way that is not data dependent, to avoid such a conﬂict.
Further details and discussion on all of this can be found in Evans [13].
As such, the prior satisﬁes this principle as well. Just as with model
checking, if the prior passes its checks this does not mean that the
prior is correct, only that beliefs about θ, as presented by the prior,
have not been contradicted by the data.
It is to be noted that, for any minimal sufﬁcient statistic T,
the joint probability measure Π×Pθ for (θ,x) factors as Π×Pθ=
Π(⋅| T)×MT×P(⋅| T) where P(⋅| T) is conditional probability of the
data given T,MT is the prior predictive for T andΠ(⋅| T) is the posterior
for θ. These probability measures are used respectively for model
checking, checking the prior and for inference about θ and, as such,
these activities are not confounded. Hereafter, it is assumed that the
model and prior have passed their checks so we focus on inference. It
is not at all clear that any other ingredients, such as loss functions, can
satisfy the principle of empirical criticismbut, to deﬁne ameasure of ev-
idence nothing beyond themodel and the prior is required, so this is not
a concern.
Given amodel {fθ:θ∈Θ}, a priorπ and data x, we pose the basic prob-
lems of statistical inference as follows. There is a parameter of interest
Ψ :Θ→Ψ (we do not distinguish between the function and its range
to save notation) and there are two basic inferences.
Estimation: Provide an estimate of the true value ofψ=Ψ(θ) togeth-
er with an assessment of the accuracy of the estimate.
Hypothesis assessment: Provide a statement of the evidence that the
hypothesis H0:Ψ(θ)=ψ0 is either true or false together with an as-
sessment of the strength of this evidence.
Someof the statement concerning hypothesis assessment is in italics
because typically themeasure of the strength of the evidence is not sep-
arated from the statement of the evidence itself. For example, large
values for Bayes factors and very small p-values are often cited as corre-
sponding to strong evidence. In fact, separating themeasure of evidence
from a measure of its strength helps to resolve various difﬁculties.
There are of course many discussions in the statistical literature
concerning the measurement of evidence. Chapter 3 of Evans [13] con-
tains extensive analyses ofmany of these and documentswhy they can-
not be considered as fully satisfactory treatments of statistical evidence.
For example, sections of that text are devoted to discussions of pure
likelihood theory, frequentist theory and p-values, Bayesian theoriesand Bayes factors, and ﬁducial inference. Some of the salient points
are presented in the following paragraphs together with further
references.
Edwards [10] and Royall [26] develop an approach to inference
based upon recognizing the centrality of the concept of statistical evi-
dence and measuring this using likelihood ratios for the full model pa-
rameter θ. A likelihood ratio, however, is a measure of relative
evidence between two values of θ and is not a measure of the evidence
that a particular value θ is true. The relative belief ratio for θ, deﬁned in
Section 2, is a measure of the evidence that θ is true and furthermore a
calibration of this measure of evidence is provided. While these are sig-
niﬁcant differences in the two approaches, there are also similarities be-
tween the pure likelihood approach and relative belief approach to
evidence. For example, it is easily seen that the relative belief ratio for
θ gives the same ratios between two values as the likelihood function.
Another key difference arises, however, when considering measuring
evidence for an arbitrary ψ=Ψ(θ). Pure likelihood theory does not
deal with such marginal parameters in a satisfactory way and the stan-
dard recommendation is to use a proﬁle likelihood. A proﬁle likelihood
is generally not a likelihood and so the basic motivating idea is lost. By
contrast the relative belief ratio for such a ψ is deﬁned in a consistent
way as a measure of change in belief.
In frequency theory p-values are commonly used asmeasures of ev-
idence. A basic issue that arises with the p-value is that a large value of
such a quantity cannot be viewed as evidence that a hypothesis is true.
This is because in many examples, a p-value is uniformly distributed
when the hypothesis is true. It seems clear that any validmeasure of ev-
idence must be able to provide evidence for something being true as
well as evidence against and this is the case for the relative belief
ratio. Another key problem for p-values arises with so-called “data
snooping” as discussed in Cornﬁeld [6] where an investigator who
wants to use the standard 5% value for signiﬁcance can be prevented
from ever attaining signiﬁcance if they obtain a slightly larger value
for a given sample size and then want to sample further to settle the
issue. Royall [26] contains a discussion of many of the problems associ-
ated with p-values as measures of evidence. A much bigger issue for a
frequency theory of evidence is concerned with the concept of ancillary
statistics and the conditionality principle. The lack of a unique maximal
ancillary leads to ambiguities in the characterization of evidence as ex-
empliﬁed by the discussion in Birnbaum [2], Evans, Fraser and Monette
[14] and Evans [12]. A satisfactory frequentist theory of evidence re-
quires a full resolution of this issue. The book Taper and Lele [29] con-
tains a number of papers discussing the concept of evidence in the
frequentist and pure likelihood contexts.
In a Bayesian formulation the Bayes factor is commonly used as a
measure of evidence. The relationship between the Bayes factor and
the relative belief ratio is discussed in Section 2. It is also the case, how-
ever, that posterior probabilities are used as measures of evidence. Rel-
ative belief theory, however, draws a sharp distinction between
measuring beliefs, which is the role of probability, and measuring evi-
dence, which is measured by change in beliefs from a priori to a
posteriori. As discussed in the following sections, being careful about
this distinction is seen to resolve a number of anomalies for inference.
Closely related to Bayesian inference is entropic inference as discussed,
for example, in Caticha [3,4]. In entropic inference relative entropy plays
a key role in determining how beliefs are to be updated after obtaining
information. This is not directly related to relative belief as discussed
here, although updating beliefs via conditional probability is central to
the approach and so there are some points in common. Another ap-
proach to measuring statistical evidence, based on a thermodynamical
analogy, can be found in Vieland [31].
The Dempster–Shafer theory of belief functions, as presented in
Shafer [28], is another approach to the development of a theory of evi-
dence. This arises by extending the usual formulation of probability, as
themeasure of belief in the truth of a proposition, towhat could be con-
sidered as upper and lower bounds on this belief. While this clearly
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fundamental distinction arises from measuring evidence via a change
in belief in the relative belief approach as opposed to using probability
itself or bounds based on probabilities. Cuzzolin [8] discusses a mathe-
matical function mapping a belief function to a probability measure
called the relative belief transform. Basically the relative belief trans-
form of a belief function deﬁned on a ﬁnite set, is the probability func-
tion obtained by normalizing the belief function restricted to singleton
sets. As will be seen in Section 2, this is not related to the relative belief
ratio as a measure of evidence.
2. The relative belief ratio and inferences
To determine inferences three simple principles are needed. First is
the principle of conditional probability that tells us how beliefs should
change after receiving evidence bearing on the truth of an event. We
let Ω denote a general sample space for response ω with associated
probability measure P.
The principle of conditional probability: For events A ,C⊂Ω with
P(C)N0, if told that the event C has occurred, then replace P(A) by P
ðA j CÞ ¼ PðA∩CÞ=PðCÞ:
This leads to a very simple characterization of evidence.
Principle of evidence: If P(A |C)NP(A), then there is evidence in favor
of A being true because the belief inAhas increased. If P(A | C)bP(A),
then there is evidenceA is false because the belief in A has decreased.
If P(A | C)=P(A), then there isn't evidence either in favor of A or
against A as belief in A has not changed.
This principle suggests that any valid measure of the quantity of ev-
idence is a function of (P(A),P(A | C)). A number of suchmeasures have
been discussed in the literature and Crupi et al. [7] contains a nice sur-
vey. A detailed examination in Evans [13] leads to selecting the relative
belief ratio as the most natural as virtually all the others are either
equivalent to this or do not behave properly in the limit for continuous
models.
Principle of relative belief: The evidence that A is true, having ob-
served C, is measured by the relative belief ratio RB(A |C)=P(A |C)/
P(A) when P(A)N0.
So, for example, RB(A | C)N1 implies that observing C is evidence in
favor of A and the bigger RB(A |C) is, the more evidence in favor.
The Bayes factor is also used as ameasure of evidence. The Bayes fac-
tor BF(A |C) in favor of A being true is the ratio of the posterior to prior
odds in favor of A. It is easily shown that BF(A |C)=RB(A |C)/B(Ac |C),
namely, from the point of view of the relative belief ratio, the Bayes fac-
tor is a comparison between the evidence in favor of A and the evidence
in favor of its negation. The relative belief ratio satisﬁes RB(A |C)=
BF(A |C)/(1−P(A)+P(A)BF(A |C)) and so cannot be expressed in
terms of the Bayes factor itself. From this it is concluded that the relative
belief ratio is a somewhat more elemental measure of evidence. As
discussed in Baskurt and Evans [1] and Evans [13], the relative belief
ratio is preferred as a measure of evidence as it leads to a much simpler
theory of inference.
For the statistical context suppose interest is in ψ=Ψ(θ). Let πΨ(⋅|x)
and πΨ denote the posterior and prior densities of ψ. Then the three
principles imply that the relative belief ratio
RBΨ ψ j xð Þ¼πΨ ψ j xð Þ=πΨ ψð Þ
is the appropriate measure of the evidence that ψ is the true value and
this holds as a limit in the continuous case, see Evans [13]. Also, in the
continuous case, the limiting value of the Bayes factor is given by
RBΨ(ψ | x) so the measures agree in that context. Given RBΨ(⋅|x), this
prescribes a total order for the ψ values as ψ1 is not preferred to ψ2whenever RBΨ(ψ1|x)≤RBΨ(ψ2 |x) since there is at least as much evi-
dence for ψ2 as there is for ψ1. This in turn leads to unambiguous solu-
tions to the inference problems.
2.1. Estimation
The best estimate of ψ is the value for which the evidence is greatest,
namely,
ψ xð Þ¼ arg sup RBΨ ψjxð Þ;
and called the least relative surprise estimator in Evans [11], Evans
and Shakhatreh [22] and Evans and Jang [18]. Associated with this is a
γ-relative belief credible region
CΨ;γ xð Þ¼ ψ : RBΨ ψjxð Þ ≥ cΨ;γ xð Þ
 
where cΨ ,γ(x)= inf{k :ΠΨ(RBΨ(ψ |x)≤k |x)≥1−γ}. Notice that ψ(x)∈
CΨ ,γ(x) for every γ∈[0,1] and so, for selected γ, the size of CΨ ,γ(x) can
be taken as ameasure of the accuracy of the estimate ψ(x). Given the in-
terpretation of RBΨ(ψ |x) as the evidence for ψ, we are forced to use the
sets CΨ ,γ(x) for the credible regions. For if ψ1 is in such a region and
RBΨ(ψ2|x)≥RBΨ(ψ1|x), then ψ2 must be in the region as well as there
is at least asmuch evidence forψ2 as forψ1. This presents the relative be-
lief solution to the Estimation problem.
2.2. Hypothesis assessment
For the assessment of the hypothesis H0:Ψ(θ)=ψ0, the evidence is
given by RBΨ(ψ0 |x). One problem that both the relative belief ratio
and the Bayes factor share as measures of evidence, is that it is not
clear how they should be calibrated. Certainly the bigger RBΨ(ψ0|x) is
than 1, the more evidence there is in favor of ψ0 while the smaller
RBΨ(ψ0|x) is than 1, themore evidence there is against ψ0. But what ex-
actly does a value of RBΨ(ψ0|x)=20mean? Itwould appear to be strong
evidence in favor of ψ0 because beliefs have increased by a factor of 20
after seeing the data. But what if other values of ψ have even larger
increases?
The value RBΨ(ψ0|x) can be calibrated, however, by comparing it to
the other possible values RBΨ(⋅|x) through its posterior distribution. For
example, one possible measure of the strength is
ΠΨ RBΨ ψjxð Þ ≤ RBΨ ψ0jxð Þjxð Þ ð1Þ
which is the posterior probability that the true value of ψ has a relative
belief ratio no greater than that of the hypothesized value ψ0. While
Eq. (1) may look like a p-value, it has a very different interpretation.
For when RBΨ(ψ0|x)b1, so there is evidence against ψ0, then a small
value for Eq. (1) indicates a large posterior probability that the true
value has a relative belief ratio greater than RBΨ(ψ0 |x) and there is
strong evidence against ψ0. If RBΨ(ψ0 |x)N1, so there is evidence in
favor of ψ0, then a large value for Eq. (1) indicates a small posterior
probability that the true value has a relative belief ratio greater than
RBΨ(ψ0|x) and so there is strong evidence in favor of ψ0. Notice that,
in the set {ψ :RBΨ(ψ |x)≤RBΨ(ψ0 |x)}, the “best” estimate of the true
value is given by ψ0 simply because the evidence for this value is the
largest in this set.
Various results have been established in Baskurt and Evans
[1] supporting both RBΨ(ψ0 |x), as the measure of the evidence,
and Eq. (1), as a measure of the strength of that evidence. For example,
the following simple inequalities are useful in assessing the strength,
namely:
ΠΨ RBΨ ψjxð Þ¼RBΨ ψ0jxð Þjxð Þ ≤ ΠΨ RBΨ ψjxð Þ ≤ RBΨ ψ0jxð Þjxð Þ
≤ RBΨ ψ0jxð Þ:
Fig. 1. The prior *** and the posterior — densities in Example 2.
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evidence in favor of ψ0 while, if RBΨ(ψ0 | x)b1 is very small, then
there is immediately strong evidence against ψ0.
To seemore clearly the issue concerning calibration consider the fol-
lowing basic example. Suppose that the data x is a sample of n from a
N(μ,σ2) distribution, with μ∈R1 unknown and σ2 known, and the
prior is given by a N(μ0,τ02) distribution. It is common to take τ02 very
large to reﬂect the lack of much prior information about the true value
of μ. But it is easily shown that (see Baskurt and Evans [1] or Evans
[13]), for any particular value of μ, then RB(μ |x)→∞ as τ02→∞ and this
is also true of the Bayes factor as it equals RB(μ |x) in this case. So by
being appropriately uninformative about the true value of μ, one can
make the evidence in favor of a particular value of μ as large as one
likes. This example also produces the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox because
it is possible that the classical frequentist p-value is very small when
assessing the hypothesis that μ0 is the true value, while the correspond-
ing relative belief ratio/Bayes factor is large in favor of this hypothesis
and so these measures contradict each other. When the relative belief
ratio is calibrated, however, the classical p-value is seen to arise as a
measure of the strength of the evidence and so this says that, while
there may be evidence in favor of μ0, it may be weak evidence. It is
clear that by choosing the prior to be very diffuse a bias in favor of the
hypothesis is being introduced and the ﬁnal resolution of the paradox
is accomplished by computing what is referred to as bias in favor, as is
discussed in the following section. This example makes it clear that
the value of a relative belief ratio or Bayes factor cannot be interpreted
generally as a measure of the strength of the evidence.
2.3. Bias
There is another issue associated with using RBΨ(ψ0|x) to assess the
evidence thatψ0 is the true value. One of the key concernswith Bayesian
inference methods is that the choice of the prior can bias the analysis in
various ways. An approach to dealing with the bias issue is discussed in
Baskurt and Evans [1]. Given that the assessment of the evidence thatψ0
is true is based on RBΨ(ψ0|x), the solution is tomeasure a prioriwhether
or not the chosen prior induces bias either in favor of or against ψ0. To
see how to do this, note ﬁrst the Savage–Dickey ratio result (see Dickey
[9]), which says that
RBΨ ψ0jxð Þ¼m xjψ0ð Þ=m xð Þ ð2Þ
where mðxjψ0Þ¼∫fθ:ΨðθÞ¼ψ0gπðθjψ0Þ f θðxÞ dθ is the conditional prior-
predictive density of the data x given that Ψ(θ)=ψ0 and mðxÞ¼
∫ΘμðθÞ f θðxÞ dθ is the prior-predictive density of the data x.
From Eq. (2) the bias in the evidence against ψ0 can bemeasured by
computing
M m xjψ0ð Þ=m xð Þ≤1 jψ0ð Þ; ð3Þ
where M(⋅|ψ0) is the prior probability measure of the data given that
ψ0 is the true value. Therefore, Eq. (3) is the prior probability that
evidence for ψ0 will not be obtained when ψ0 is true. So when Eq. (3)
is large there is bias against ψ0 and subsequently reporting that there
is evidence against ψ0 is not convincing. To measure the bias in favor
of ψ0, choose values ψ0' ≠ψ0 such that the difference between ψ0 and
ψ0' represents the smallest difference of practical importance. Then
compute
M m xjψ0ð Þ=m xð Þ≥1jψ
0
0
 
; ð4Þ
as this is the prior probability that evidence againstψ0will not beobtain-
edwhenψ0 is false. Note that Eq. (4) tends to decrease asψ0' moves away
from ψ0. When Eq. (4) is large, there is bias in favor of ψ0 and so subse-
quently reporting that evidence in favor ofψ0 being true has been found,
is not convincing. For a ﬁxed prior, both Eqs. (3) and (4) decrease withsample size and so, in design situations, they can be used to set sample
size and so control bias (see Evans [13]). Considering the bias in the ev-
idence is connected with the idea of a severe test as discussed in Popper
[25] and Mayo and Spanos [23].
3. Examples
Consider now examples of applying relative belief inferences. The
ﬁrst example is concerned with making inferences about an unknown
proportion.
Example 2. Inferences for a proportion.
Suppose that x=(x1,… ,xn)∈{0,1}n is observed where the xi are as-
sumed to be i.i.d. Bernoulli(θ) with θ∈ [0,1]. This could arise from
tossing a coin n times where 1 denotes a head and 0 a tail and θ is the
probability of obtaining a head. A beta(α0,β0) distribution, where α0
and β0 are speciﬁed, is taken for the prior. Let the parameter of interest
beΨ(θ)=θ. The the posterior of θ is a betaðnxþ α0;n−nxþ β0Þ distri-
bution. Let us suppose for this example that, based on an elicitation, it is
believed α0=β0=4 provides an appropriate prior so the posterior is a
betaðnxþ 4;n−nxþ 4Þ distribution.
Suppose the data is given by
x ¼ 1;1;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;0;1;1;1;1;0;1;0;0;1;0ð Þ: ð5Þ
This data was actually generated from a Bernoulli(1/2) so indeed
procedures for model checking and checking for prior-data conﬂict do
not ﬁnd any issues with the choices made. Fig. 1 is a plot of the
beta(4,4) prior together with the beta(12,16) posterior based on this
data. Clearly the data has lead to some learning concerning the true
value of θ.
For this situation
RB θ j xð Þ ¼ π θ j nxð Þ
π θð Þ
¼ Γ α0ð ÞΓ β0ð Þ
Γ α0 þ β0ð Þ
Γ nþ α0 þ β0ð Þ
Γ nxþ α0ð ÞΓ n−nxþ β0ð Þ
θnx 1−θð Þn−nx
and this is plotted in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Plot of RB(θ | x) in Example 2.
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have θ(x)=θMLE(x) which in this case is x ¼ 0:400. To assess the accura-
cy of this estimate, we compute the 0.95-credible region
C0:95 xð Þ ¼ θ : RB θ j xð Þ≥c0:95 xð Þf g:
which is also a likelihood interval for θ. Here C0.95(x)=(0.227,0.593)
and its length 0.593−0.227=0.366 indicates that there is a reasonable
degree of uncertainty about the true value of θ. Note that, while relative
belief inferences for θ take the same form as likelihood inferences for θ,
it is not correct to consider RB(⋅| x) as a likelihood function as multiply-
ing it by a positive constant destroys its interpretation as a measure of
evidence. For a generalΨ(θ), the relative belief ratio RBΨ(⋅| x) is not pro-
portional to a proﬁle likelihood function.
To assess the hypothesis H0:θ=θ0 compute RB(θ0 | x). In this case,
when θ0=1/2, then RB(1/2 | x)=1.421, and since this is greater than
1, there is evidence in favor of H0. For the strength of this evidence we
obtain,
Π RB θ j xð Þ ≤ RB 1=2 j xð Þ j nx ¼ 8ð Þ ¼ 0:309
and conclude that the evidence in favor of H0 is only moderate as there
is a posterior probability of 0.691 that the true value of θ has a larger rel-
ative belief ratio. It is wrong, however, to conclude from the value 0.691
that there is evidence against θ0=1/2 because indeed the data have
lead to an increase in belief that this is the true value. At the same
time it is reasonable to have some concern about the reliability of this
inference since the strength is not large. To seewhat the strength repre-
sents graphically consider Fig. 2 and draw a horizontal line at height
0.309. This line intersects the graph of RB(⋅| x) at two points which,
when projected onto the θ-axis, gives an interval of θ values. The
strength is then the posterior content of the two tails that form the com-
plement of this interval togetherwith the end-points. This geometric in-
terpretation generalizes in an obvious way to the situation where θ is
multidimensional.
To assess the bias against H0:θ=1/2, compute the prior probability,
when H0 is true, that evidence against H0 will be obtained, namely,
M
m x j 1=2ð Þ
m xð Þ ≤ 1 j θ0
 
¼ 0:265:This indicates onlymodest bias against θ0. Bias in favor ofH0:θ=1/2
is measured by the prior probability, when θ=θ⁎∈{0.45,0.55} is true,
that there is evidence in favor of H0, namely,
M
m x j θ0ð Þ
m xð Þ N1 j 0:45
 
¼ 0:692;M m x j θ0ð Þ
m xð Þ N1 j 0:55
 
¼ 0:692:
So there is some bias in favor of H0={1/2} induced by the beta(4,4)
prior, at least when a deviation of 0.05 from the null is considered as
meaningful. A smaller deviation considered as meaningful would result
in more bias in favor of H0. As previously mentioned, both biases can be
controlled, namely, made as small as desired, by choosing the sample
size n appropriately.
The following example is very simple but nevertheless it has pro-
duced considerable confusion concerning the role of measuring evi-
dence as opposed to taking a decision-theoretic approach to statistical
inference. It emphasizes the importance of being very clear about how
to measure evidence.
Example 3. Prosecutor's fallacy.
In general, the prosecutor's fallacy refers to any kind of error in prob-
abilistic reasoning made by a prosecutor when arguing for the convic-
tion of a defendant. The paper Thompson and Schumann [30] seems
to be one of the earliest references and so that context and its relevance
to measuring statistical evidence is considered.
Suppose a population is split into two classes where a proportion ϵ
are guilty of a crime and a proportion 1−ϵ are not guilty. Suppose fur-
ther that a particular trait is held by a proportion ψ1 of those innocent
and a proportion ψ2 of those who are guilty. The overall proportion in
the population possessing the trait is then (1−ϵ)ψ1+ϵψ2 and this
will be small whenever ϵ and ψ1 are small. The values ϵ and ψ1 being
small correspond to the proportion of guilty being very small and the
trait being very rare in the population. The prosecutor notes that
the defendant has this trait and, because (1−ϵ)ψ1+ϵψ2 is very small,
concludes the defendant is guilty. Actually, as cited in Thompson
and Schumann [30], it seems that the prosecutor in question actually
quoted 1− {(1−ϵ)ψ1+ϵψ2} as the probability of guilt! In any case,
our concern here is the fallacious reasoning concerning the smallness
of (1−ϵ)ψ1+ϵψ2 and what it implies about the guilt of the defendant.
Treating ϵ as the prior probability that the defendant is guilty, with-
out observing whether or not they have the trait, it is seen immediately
that the posterior probability that the defendant is guilty, given that
they have the trait, is
P “guilty”j“defendant has the trait”ð Þ ¼ ϵψ2
1−ϵð Þψ1 þ ϵψ2
and this converges to 0 as ϵ→0. The relative belief ratio for guilt is
RB “guilty”j“defendant has the trait”ð Þ ¼ ψ2
1−ϵð Þψ1 þ ϵψ2
and the relative belief ratio for innocence is
RB “innocent”j“defendant has the trait”ð Þ ¼ ψ1
1−ϵð Þψ1 þ ϵψ2
:
Now RB (“guilty” | “defendant has the trait”) N 1 if and only if ψ2Nψ1
and this occurs if and only if RB (“innocent” |“defendant has the
trait”) b 1. If the trait is at all useful in terms of determining guilt, it is
sensible to supposeψ2Nψ1 and, under these circumstances, it is certain-
ly reasonable to say there is evidence in favor of guilt as the probability
of guilt has increased from a priori to a posteriori.
The question now is: does relative belief commit a prosecutor's
fallacy? It might seem so as there will always be evidence of guilt
when the trait is observed. Recall, however, that there are two parts to
a relative belief inferencewhether estimation or hypothesis assessment,
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ence. Under these circumstances we have that ψ(“defendant has
the trait”) = “guilty” but it is clear that CΨ ,γ(“defendant has the
trait”)→ {“guilty,” “not guilty”} as ϵ→0 for any γN0. So for small ϵ the
estimate has no accuracy at all! Furthermore, if we elected instead to as-
sess the hypothesis H0: “guilty,” then the strength of this evidence is
best assessed, since there are only two possible values, using the poste-
rior probability P (“guilty” | “defendant has the trait”) and this con-
verges to 0 as ϵ→0 and again there is only very weak evidence in
favor of guilt. So using the relative belief ratio to assess evidence, togeth-
er with a measure of the strength of the evidence, protects against the
prosecutor's fallacy as we will surely not convict based upon evidence
in favor of guilt that is considered weak.
But the situation is more complicated than this yet and exposes a
clear distinction between taking a decision-based approach and an evi-
dential one. For consider the problem where ϵ corresponds to the pro-
portion of individuals infected with a deadly infectious disease and
ψ1 ,ψ2 correspond to the probabilities of a test for infection being posi-
tive in the noninfected and infected populations, respectively. A good
test will of course have ψ2Nψ1 and so we are in exactly the same situa-
tion as, for a patient with a positive test, relative belief will record that
there is evidence the patient is infected. Even if this is weak evidence,
however, it would seem somewhat foolhardy to simply ignore the
evidence.
A standard approach in this simple classiﬁcation problem is to esti-
mate ψ using the value that maximizes the posterior, called the MAP
(maximum a posteriori) estimate. For ϵ small enough, this will declare
the defendant innocent and the patient noninfected. In the former
case this is reasonable but surely not in the latter case. It would seem
that a categorical statement is not what is wanted from a statistical pro-
cedure in such problems. Undoubtedly decisions will be ultimately be
made and these decisions may, for good reasons, ignore what the evi-
dence says, but the additional criteria that come into play inmaking de-
cisions are not statistical in nature. What is wanted from a theory of
statistics is a statement concerning what the evidence indicates and,
in addition, how strong that evidence is.
4. Conclusions
A broad outline of relative belief theory has been described here.
The inferences have many nice properties like invariance under
reparameterizations and a wide variety of optimal properties in the
class of all Bayesian inferences. The papers Evans [11], Evans, Guttman,
and Swartz, [15], Evans and Shakhatreh [22], Evans and Jang [18] and
Baskurt and Evans [1] are primarily devoted to development of the the-
ory. Many of these papers contain applications to speciﬁc problems but
also see Evans, Gilula andGuttman [19], Cao, Evans andGuttman [5] and
Muthukumarana and Evans [24]. Evans [13] presents a full development
of relative belief theory together with procedures for model checking
and checking for prior-data conﬂict.
It is worth emphasizing that for practitioners there are two ingredi-
ents that need to be speciﬁed to apply the theory of relative belief to sta-
tistical analyses, namely, the model {fθ:θ∈Θ} and the prior π. Neither of
these ingredients is necessarily determined by the application. In the
end they are choices made by the practitioner which hopefully repre-
sent good judgment. In the event that these are poor choices, then it
can be expected that the inferences may be erroneous and this is why
the activities of model checking and checking for prior-data conﬂict
are so important. If after these checks there is no reason to reject the
choices made, then inference can proceed and relative belief gives an
unambiguous approach to this. This lack of ambiguity is important as
the failure of theories of inference to effectively solve inferenceproblems leads to doubts as to the validity of inferences drawn on an
ad hoc basis. The validity of relative belief inferences, once the basic
principles are accepted, then rests with the choices made for the
model and prior. Of course, it can never be said that these choices are
“correct” only that they are not substantially wrong. These choices are
essentially subjective in nature but the theory gives us tools for
assessing any bias that the choices may have introduced into the analy-
sis. This is the most we can expect from any theory of statistical
inference.
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